? All interventions
Importance “Nudges” that influence decision making through subtle cognitive mechanisms have been shown to be highly effective in a wide range of applications, but there have been few experiments to improve clinical practice. Objective To investigate the use of a behavioral “nudge” based on the principle of public commitment in encouraging the judicious use of antibiotics for acute respiratory infections (ARIs). Design, Setting, and Participants Randomized clinical trial in 5 outpatient primary care clinics. A total of 954 adults had ARI visits during the study timeframe: 449 patients were treated by clinicians randomized to the posted commitment letter (335 in the baseline period, 114 in the intervention period); 505 patients were treated by clinicians randomized to standard practice control (384 baseline, 121 intervention). Interventions The intervention consisted of displaying poster-sized commitment letters in examination rooms for 12 weeks. These letters, featuring clinician photographs and signatures, stated their commitment to avoid inappropriate antibiotic prescribing for ARIs. Main Outcomes and Measures Antibiotic prescribing rates for antibiotic-inappropriate ARI diagnoses in baseline and intervention periods, adjusted for patient age, sex, and insurance status. Results Baseline rates were 43.5% and 42.8% for control and poster, respectively. During the intervention period, inappropriate prescribing rates increased to 52.7% for controls but decreased to 33.7% in the posted commitment letter condition. Controlling for baseline prescribing rates, we found that the posted commitment letter resulted in a 19.7 absolute percentage reduction in inappropriate antibiotic prescribing rate relative to control (P = .02). There was no evidence of diagnostic coding shift, and rates of appropriate antibiotic prescriptions did not diminish over time. Conclusions and Relevance Displaying poster-sized commitment letters in examination rooms decreased inappropriate antibiotic prescribing for ARIs. The effect of this simple, low-cost intervention is comparable in magnitude to costlier, more intensive quality-improvement efforts.
Compared to whites, African Americans have a greater incidence of diabetes, decreased control, and higher rates of micro-vascular complications. A peer mentorship model could be a scalable approach to improving control in this population and reducing disparities in diabetic outcomes. Objective
To determine whether peer mentors or financial incentives are superior to usual care in helping African American Veterans improve their glycosylated hemoglobin (HbA1c) levels. Design
A six month randomized controlled trial. (ClinicalTrials.gov registration number: NCT01125956) Setting
The Philadelphia VA Medical Center. Patients
African American veterans, age 50-70 years old, with persistently poor diabetes control. Measurements
Change in HbA1c at 6 months Intervention
118 participants were randomized to one of the three arms. Usual care participants were notified of their starting HbA1c and recommended goals for HbA1c. Those in the peer mentor arm were assigned a peer mentor who formerly had poor glycemic control but now had good control (HbA1c < 7.5%) who was asked to talk with the participant at least once a week. Peer mentors were matched on race, sex, and age. Those in the financial incentive arm could earn $100 by dropping their HbA1c by one point and $200 by dropping it by two points or to a HbA1c of 6.5%. Results
Mentors and mentees talked the most in the first month (mean calls 4: range 0-30) and dropped to a mean of 2 calls (range 0-10) by the sixth month. HbA1c dropped from 9.9% to 9.8% in the control arm, 9.8% to 8.7% in the peer mentor arm and from 9.5% to 9.1% in the financial incentive arm. Mean change in HbA1c from baseline to 6 months relative to control was −1.07 (95% CI −1.84 to −0.31) in the peer mentor arm and −0.45 (95% CI −1.23 to 0.32) in the financial incentive arm. Limitations
The study included only veterans and lasted only 6 months. Conclusions
Peer mentorship improved glucose control in a cohort of African American Veterans with diabetes.
Vote-buying and vote-selling obstruct the democratic process, yet they remain pervasive in many developing democracies. Researchers asked voters in the Philippines to make a simple, unenforceable promise not to accept money from politicians or to promise to vote according to their conscience, even if they do accept money, to test the impact of promises on voters’ behavior. A majority of respondents made promises not to sell their votes. Researchers found that the promise significantly reduced vote-selling, cutting the number of people who sold their votes by 11 percentage points in the smallest-stakes election, but was not effective in the mayoral election with higher pay-outs. These results suggest that simply asking voters to promise not to sell votes can help reduce vote-selling in elections where vote-buying payments are typically small.