? All interventions
| KG. Volpp, DA Asch, George Loewenstein, JD Park, J Zhu, Y Tao, MF Hu, SL Bellamy, B Stearman, EB Riley, TB Sewell, AP Sen|
J Gen Intern Med. 2014 May;29(5):770-7.
Home wireless device monitoring could play an important role in improving the health of patients with poorly controlled chronic diseases, but daily engagement rates among these patients may be low. OBJECTIVE:
To test the effectiveness of two different magnitudes of financial incentives for improving adherence to remote-monitoring regimens among patients with poorly controlled diabetes. DESIGN:
Randomized, controlled trial. (Clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT01282957). PARTICIPANTS:
Seventy-five patients with a hemoglobin A1c greater than or equal to 7.5% recruited from a Primary Care Medical Home practice at the University of Pennsylvania Health System. INTERVENTIONS:
Twelve weeks of daily home-monitoring of blood glucose, blood pressure, and weight (control group; n = 28); a lottery incentive with expected daily value of $2.80 (n = 26) for daily monitoring; and a lottery incentive with expected daily value of $1.40 (n = 21) for daily monitoring. MAIN MEASURES:
Daily use of three home-monitoring devices during the three-month intervention (primary outcome) and during the three-month follow-up period and change in A1c over the intervention period (secondary outcomes). KEY RESULTS:
Incentive arm participants used devices on a higher proportion of days relative to control (81% low incentive vs. 58%, P = 0.007; 77% high incentive vs. 58%, P = 0.02) during the three-month intervention period. There was no difference in adherence between the two incentive arms (P = 0.58). When incentives were removed, adherence in the high incentive arm declined while remaining relatively high in the low incentive arm. In month 6, the low incentive arm had an adherence rate of 62% compared to 35% in the high incentive arm (P = 0.015) and 27% in the control group (P = 0.002). CONCLUSIONS:
A daily lottery incentive worth $1.40 per day improved monitoring rates relative to control and had significantly better efficacy once incentives were removed than a higher incentive.
A loan application should collect necessary information while providing a painless, easy, and engaging experience for members and potential new members. Our recommendations for improving the loan application process were driven by three behavioral principles essential to the design of any human process: (1) reducing perceived hassles and uncer-tainty wherever possible; (2) avoiding jargon; and (3) designing with potential user error in mind. Our recommen-dations for Alliant included a new process timeline to more accurately set applicant expectations and reflected progress through the application; reframing key decision points to ensure users do not accidentally cancel their applications; and revising language that may be unfamiliar to some applicants, such as “collateral,” “debt-to-income,” and “co-borrower.” These principles and recommendations may seem simple, but through our work we have seen how even small changes can have big impacts on client behaviors. Moreover, as service designers, intimately aware of the loan process, it can be difficult for financial experts to design financial products and services that feel intuitive and easy to understand to new users. Alliant has incorporated the majority of our design recommendations into the new loan application process.
| George Loewenstein, J Price, K Volpp|
We present findings from a field experiment conducted at 40 elementary schools involving 8000 children and 400,000 child-day observations, which tested whether providing short-run incentives can create habit formation in children. Over a 3- or 5-week period, students received an incentive for eating a serving of fruits or vegetables during lunch. Relative to an average baseline rate of 39%, providing small incentives doubled the fraction of children eating at least one serving of fruits or vegetables. Two months after the end of the intervention, the consumption rate at schools remained 21% above baseline for the 3-week treatment and 44% above baseline for the 5-week treatment. These findings indicate that short-run incentives can produce changes in behavior that persist after incentives are removed.
Data on the effectiveness of employer-sponsored financial incentives for employee weight loss are limited. OBJECTIVE:
To test the effectiveness of 2 financial incentive designs for promoting weight loss among obese employees. DESIGN:
Randomized, controlled trial. (ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT01208350) SETTING:
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia. PARTICIPANTS:
105 employees with a body mass index between 30 and 40 kg/m2. INTERVENTION:
24 weeks of monthly weigh-ins (control group; n = 35); individual incentive, designed as $100 per person per month for meeting or exceeding weight-loss goals (n = 35); and group incentive, designed as $500 per month split among participants within groups of 5 who met or exceeded weight-loss goals (n = 35). MEASUREMENTS:
Weight loss after 24 weeks (primary outcome) and 36 weeks and changes in behavioral mediators of weight loss (secondary outcomes). RESULTS:
Group-incentive participants lost more weight than control participants (mean between-group difference, 4.4 kg [95% CI, 2.0 to 6.7 kg]; P < 0.001) and individual-incentive participants (mean between-group difference, 3.2 kg [CI, 0.9 to 5.5 kg]; P = 0.008). Twelve weeks after incentives ended and after adjustment for 3-group comparisons, group-incentive participants maintained greater weight loss than control group participants (mean between-group difference, 2.9 kg [CI, 0.5 to 5.3 kg]; P = 0.016) but not greater than individual-incentive participants (mean between-group difference, 2.7 kg [CI, 0.4 to 5.0 kg]; P = 0.024). LIMITATION:
Single employer and short follow-up. CONCLUSION:
A group-based financial incentive was more effective than an individual incentive and monthly weigh-ins at promoting weight loss among obese employees at 24 weeks.
| M Kosfeld, S Neckermann|
We study the impact of status and social recognition on worker performance in a field experiment. In collaboration with an international non-governmental organization, we hired students to work on a database project. Students in the award treatment were offered a congratulatory card honoring the best performance. The award was purely symbolic to ensure that any behavioral effect is driven by non-material benefits. Our results show that the award increases performance by about 12 percent on average. The results provide strong evidence for the motivating power of status and social recognition in labor relations. (JEL C93, J33, M12, M52)
Background Poor adherence to medications is a major cause of morbidity and inadequate drug effectiveness. Efforts to improve adherence have typically been either ineffective or too complex to implement in clinical practice. Lottery-based incentive interventions could be a scalable approach to improving adherence.MethodsThis was a randomized, controlled clinical trial of a daily lottery-based incentive in patients on warfarin stratified by baseline international normalized ratio (INR). The trial randomized 100 patients to either a lottery-based incentive or no lottery intervention. Main outcome was out-of-range INRs.ResultsOver 6 months, the overall percentage of out-of-range INRs did not differ between the 2 arms (mean 23.0% in lottery arm and 25.9% in control arm, adjusted odds ratio[OR]0.93,95%CI0.62-1.41). However, among the a priori subgroup with a baseline INR below therapeutic range, there was a significant reduction in out-of-range INR in the lottery arm versus the control arm (adjusted OR 0.39, 95% CI 0.25-0.62), whereas there was no such effect among those with therapeutic INRs at baseline(adjusted OR 1.26, 95% CI, 0.76-2.09, P value for interaction = .0016). Among those with low INR at baseline, there was a nonsignificant 49% reduction in the odds of nonadherence with the intervention (OR 0.51, 95% CI 0.23-1.14).ConclusionsAlthough a lottery-based intervention was not associated with a significant improvement in anticoagulation control among all study participants, it improved control among an a priori group of patients at higher risk for poor adherence.(Am Heart J 2012;164:268-74.)
| E Haisley, Kevin Volpp, T Pellathy, George Loewenstein|
The biggest challenge for corporate wellness initiatives is low rates of employee participation. We test whether a behavioral economic approach to incentive design (i.e., a lottery) is more effective than a direct economic payment of equivalent monetary value (i.e., a grocery gift certificate) in encouraging employees to complete health risk assessments (HRAs). Design.
Employees were assigned to one of three arms. Assignment to a treatment arm versus the nontreatment arm was determined by management. Assignment to an arm among those eligible for treatment was randomized by office. Setting.
A large health care management and information technology consulting company. Patients.
A total of 1299 employees across 14 offices participated. Intervention.
All employees were eligible to receive $25 for completing the HRA. Those in the lottery condition were assigned to teams of four to eight people and, conditional on HRA completion, were entered into a lottery with a prize of $100 (expected value, $25) and a bonus value of an additional $25 if 80% of team members participated. Those in the grocery gift certificate condition who completed an HRA received a $25 grocery gift certificate. Those in the comparison condition received no additional incentive. Measures.
HRA completion rates. Analysis.
Logistic regression analysis. Results.
HRA completion rates were significantly higher among participations in the lottery incentive condition (64%) than in both the grocery gift certificate condition (44%) and the comparison condition (40%). Effects were larger for lower-income employees, as indicated by a significant interaction between income and the lottery incentive. Conclusion.
Lottery incentives that incorporate regret aversion and social pressure can provide higher impact for the same amount of money as simple economic incentives.
We report the results of a randomized field experiment aimed at improving the safety of long-distance mini-busses or matatus in Kenya. Our intervention combines evocative messages aimed at motivating passengers to speak up against bad driving with a lottery that rewards matatu drivers for keeping the stickers in place. Independent insurance claims data were collected for more than 2000 long-distance matatus before and after the intervention. Our results indicate that insurance claims fell by a half to two-thirds, from a baseline annual rate of about 10%, and that claims involving injury or death fell by 60%. While we are unable to identify the mechanism(s) underlying this effect, the intervention is more cost effective in reducing mortality than other documented public health interventions.
Preventive health behaviors like flu vaccination have important benefits, but compliance is poor, and the reasons are not fully understood. We conducted a large study across six colleges (N = 9358), with a methodology that offers an unusual opportunity to look at three potential factors: inattention to information, informed intentions to not comply, and problems following through on intentions. We also tested three interventions in an RCT. We find that inattention to information is not the primary driver of low take-up, while informed decisions to not get the vaccine, but also lack of follow-through, are important factors. A financial intervention increased take-up and had persistent, positive effects on intentions for vaccination in future years. Two low-cost “nudges” did not increase vaccination rates, although the peer endorsement nudge increased exposure to information, especially if aligned with social networks.
| AV Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, Kothari|
Objective To assess the efficacy of modest non-financial incentives on immunisation rates in children aged 1-3 and to compare it with the effect of only improving the reliability of the supply of services. Design Clustered randomised controlled study. Setting Rural Rajasthan, India. Participants 1640 children aged 1-3 at end point. Interventions 134 villages were randomised to one of three groups: a once monthly reliable immunisation camp (intervention A; 379 children from 30 villages); a once monthly reliable immunisation camp with small incentives (raw lentils and metal plates for completed immunisation; intervention B; 382 children from 30 villages), or control (no intervention, 860 children in 74 villages). Surveys were undertaken in randomly selected households at baseline and about 18 months after the interventions started (end point). Main outcome measures Proportion of children aged 1-3 at the end point who were partially or fully immunised. Results Among children aged 1-3 in the end point survey, rates of full immunisation were 39% (148/382, 95% confidence interval 30% to 47%) for intervention B villages (reliable immunisation with incentives), 18% (68/379, 11% to 23%) for intervention A villages (reliable immunisation without incentives), and 6% (50/860, 3% to 9%) for control villages. The relative risk of complete immunisation for intervention B versus control was 6.7 (4.5 to 8.8) and for intervention B versus intervention A was 2.2 (1.5 to 2.8). Children in areas neighbouring intervention B villages were also more likely to be fully immunised than those from areas neighbouring intervention A villages (1.9, 1.1 to 2.8). The average cost per immunisation was $28 (1102 rupees, about £16 or €19) in intervention A and $56 (2202 rupees) in intervention B. Conclusions Improving reliability of services improves immunisation rates, but the effect remains modest. Small incentives have large positive impacts on the uptake of immunisation services in resource poor areas and are more cost effective than purely improving supply.
Importance Financial incentives to physicians or patients are increasingly used, but their effectiveness is not well established. Objective To determine whether physician financial incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician and patient incentives are more effective than control in reducing levels of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) among patients with high cardiovascular risk. Design, Setting, and Participants Four-group, multicenter, cluster randomized clinical trial with a 12-month intervention conducted from 2011 to 2014 in 3 primary care practices in the northeastern United States. Three hundred forty eligible primary care physicians (PCPs) were enrolled from a pool of 421. Of 25 627 potentially eligible patients of those PCPs, 1503 enrolled. Patients aged 18 to 80 years were eligible if they had a 10-year Framingham Risk Score (FRS) of 20% or greater, had coronary artery disease equivalents with LDL-C levels of 120 mg/dL or greater, or had an FRS of 10% to 20% with LDL-C levels of 140 mg/dL or greater. Investigators were blinded to study group, but participants were not. Interventions Primary care physicians were randomly assigned to control, physician incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician-patient incentives. Physicians in the physician incentives group were eligible to receive up to $1024 per enrolled patient meeting LDL-C goals. Patients in the patient incentives group were eligible for the same amount, distributed through daily lotteries tied to medication adherence. Physicians and patients in the shared incentives group shared these incentives. Physicians and patients in the control group received no incentives tied to outcomes, but all patient participants received up to $355 each for trial participation. Main Outcomes and Measures Change in LDL-C level at 12 months. Results Patients in the shared physician-patient incentives group achieved a mean reduction in LDL-C of 33.6 mg/dL (95% CI, 30.1-37.1; baseline, 160.1 mg/dL; 12 months, 126.4 mg/dL); those in physician incentives achieved a mean reduction of 27.9 mg/dL (95% CI, 24.9-31.0; baseline, 159.9 mg/dL; 12 months, 132.0 mg/dL); those in patient incentives achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL (95% CI, 21.6-28.5; baseline, 160.6 mg/dL; 12 months, 135.5 mg/dL); and those in the control group achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL (95% CI, 21.7-28.5; baseline, 161.5 mg/dL; 12 months, 136.4 mg/dL; P < .001 for comparison of all 4 groups). Only patients in the shared physician-patient incentives group achieved reductions in LDL-C levels statistically different from those in the control group (8.5 mg/dL; 95% CI, 3.8-13.3; P = .002). Conclusions and Relevance In primary care practices, shared financial incentives for physicians and patients, but not incentives to physicians or patients alone, resulted in a statistically significant difference in reduction of LDL-C levels at 12 months. This reduction was modest, however, and further information is needed to understand whether this approach represents good value.
A randomized evaluation found that a one-time message increased attendance at peer tutoring sessions by 7 percentage points, from 29% to 36%. Attendance at multiple tutoring sessions increased by 6 percentage points, from 18% to 24%.
there was a mismatch between the actual rent due date (the first of the month) and when renters perceived rent to be due (the 10 th of the month, when penalties kicked in).
Good adherence to HIV medication is crucial to extend the length and quality of life and to eliminate transmission of HIV to others. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, only 29% of people living with HIV (PLHIV) have viral suppression, the ultimate goal of treatment.
| Dean Karlan, M McConnell, S Mullainathan, J Zinman|
Management Science, Volume 62 No. 12 pp. 3393-3411
Randomized evaluations in each country found that clients who were sent reminders had saved more and were more likely to have reached their savings goals by the commitment end dates (around a year after opening accounts) than clients who did not receive the messages.
Farmers in Bangladesh received incentives to refer peers for agricultural training, in some cases contingent on the referred farmer adopting the innovation.
| MJJ Handgraaf, Margriet van Lidth de Jeude, Kirstin Appelt|
Energy consumption is a major source of CO2 emissions, which contribute to global climate change. Although technological solutions can help reduce CO2 emissions, behavioral changes are necessary to achieve sufficient reductions.
| GC Bryan, Mobarak Shyamal|
Hunger during pre-harvest lean seasons is widespread in the agrarian areas of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. We randomly assign an $8.50 incentive to households in rural Bangladesh to temporarily out-migrate during the lean season. The incentive induces 22% of households to send a seasonal migrant, their consumption at the origin increases significantly, and treated households are 8–10 percentage points more likely to re-migrate 1 and 3 years after the incentive is removed. These facts can be explained qualitatively by a model in which migration is risky, mitigating risk requires individual-specific learning, and some migrants are sufficiently close to subsistence that failed migration is very costly. We document evidence consistent with this model using heterogeneity analysis and additional experimental variation, but calibrations with forward-looking households that can save up to migrate suggest that it is difficult for the model to quantitatively match the data. We conclude with extensions to the model that could provide a better quantitative accounting of the behavior.